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Deterrence likewise is insufficient justification for the continued application of the felony-murder rule to non-dangerous felonies. As argued
in the dissent in Chambers, if the felon has no reason to suspect that a
homicide will result from his act, he is not going to be deterred from
committing the felony by the threat of being convicted of murder for any
deaths that result.
The result of limiting the felony-murder rule to inherently or fore-

seeably dangerous felonies would not be that the felon will go unpunished.
He can still be convicted of the underlying felony and a more severe
punishment can be assessed because a death resulted. Furthermore, if the
felon's conduct is reckless and wanton, he can be convicted of manslaughter
under conventional homicide statutes without the aid of the felonymurder rule.
The felony-murder rule is a highly artificial concept of strict criminal
liability and should be given the narrowest possible application. 3 9 This
is the trend in other jurisdictions and the approach taken by both the
Model Penal Code and the Missouri Proposed Criminal Code. By refusing

to limit the application of this doctrine to inherently or foreseeably
dangerous felonies, Chambers reaches a result which neither logic nor
fairness supports.
TE

sA M. WEAR

DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE - PERSONAL
INJURY DAMAGES AS MARITAL PROPERTY

IN MISSOURI
Nixon v. Nixon1

Jeremiah Nixon, an attorney, recovered $60,000 from a drug company as an out-of-court settlement of a lawsuit for damages to his eyes
and the resulting loss of professional income caused by the taking of
medicine manufactured by that company.2 A portion of the settlement,
$25,000, was invested by Mr. Nixon in a partnership that later increased
greatly in value. A decree of dissolution of marriage was later entered
pursuant to an action instituted by Mrs. Nixon. Neither party contested
the dissolution, but both excepted to the orders relating to the division of
property. The Missouri Court of Appeals, St. Louis District, held that
the property acquired by Mr. Nixon from the settlement of his personal
injury action, and all increases in value thereof, was "marital property"
under Missouri's new marriage dissolution law, and was therefore subject
to division by the court.3
39. People v. Satchell, 6 Cal. 3d 28, 98 Cal. Rptr. 33, 489 P.2d 1361 (1971).

1. 525 S.W.2d 835 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1975).

2. Mr. Nixon netted $55,000 after payment of his attorney's fee. This

sum was placed in a separate account in his name. Id. at 839.
3. Id. The proportion of marital property which each spouse receives upon
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Section 452.330 (2), RSMo 1973 Supp., provides that marital property
is "all property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage,"
unless it falls within one of five limited exceptions. 4 Section 452.330 (3)
expressly creates a presumption that property acquired after marriage is
marital property unless it falls within one of the exceptions in section
452.330 (2).5 The Nixon court held that the settlement of Mr. Nixon's personal injury claim was not acquired in a'manner expressly exceptedO and
was therefore marital property as defined by statute..
The court apparently did not consider the legislative history of the
new dissolution act in rendering its interpretation. Section 452.330 is
based upon section 307 of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act as
originally approved in 1970.7 That section as originally approved adopted
a community property rule for the division of marital property at divorce.8
Because the property division section of the Missouri statute is derived
from that of the Uniform Act, it is fair to assume that they share the same
underlying rationale. 9 Furthermore, section 307 of the Uniform Act was
amended in 1973 to provide alternate sections because of the unwillingness

of many common law states to accept community property concepts. 10
It seems clear, then, that Missouri, by adopting section 307 as originally
approved, shows no such aversion to the underlying principles of community property law, and has adopted community property principles
for purposes of dividing property under the new dissolution act. However,
it should be noted that Missouri has adopted these principles only for
this limited purpose."
A basic tenet of community property law is that "property acquired
dissolution is to be determined by what the court deems just. § 452.330 (1), RSMo
1973 Supp.; In re Marriage of Powers, 527 S.W.2d 949 (Mo. App., D. St. L.
1975). "There is no intent to incorporate theories that each spouse is entitled
to an equal share in the marital property; . . . the court is to divide the marital
property as it deems just after considering the evidence." Fowler &gKrauskopf,
Dissolution of Marriage Under Missouri's New Divorce Law: Property Provisions,
29
B. 508, 511 (1973).
1 J.'4:MoThe
five exceptions of section 452.330 (2), RSMo 1973 Supp., are:
(1) Property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent; (2) Property acquired
in exchange for property acquired prior to marriage or in exchange for property
acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent; (3) Property acquired by a spouse
after a decree of legal separation; (4) Property excluded by valid agreement.'of
th parties; and (5) The increase in value of property acquired prior to the
marriage.

5. See Fowler & KXrauskopf, Dissolution of Marriage Under Missouri's New
Ditofce'Law: Property 'Provisions,29 J. Mo. B. 508, 512 '(197S)."
6. -525 .S.W.2d at' 839:
7. The .wording of these two .sections is virtually, identical,
8.

FAMILY LAW REPORTER, DESx

GUIDE TO THE 'UNIFORM

MARRIAGE'AND

57 (1974).
9. See Krauskopf, ,A Theory
For "Just" Division of Marital Property in
Missouri, 41 Mo. L. REv. 165 1976).
DIVORcE Acr

10. UNmFonir MARRIAGE AND DIVORdE Acr §'307 (1973); HANDBOOK OF TIE
NATIoNAL CONFERENCE OF COMSSIONERS ON, UNIroRm' LAWs 312"(1973).

11. Krauskopf, A Theory For "Just" Division of Marital Property in Missouri,
41.Mo.'L.-'REv..165, 17a (1976).
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during marriage" is meant to be property acquired by onerous, rather
than lucrative, title. 12 Property acquired by onerous title is that which
is acquired through the labor of either or both of the spouses, while
property acquired by lucrative title is that acquired through gift, inheritance, or any method which has its basis in pure donation.' 3 The
Missouri statute seems to accept this concept, since it specifically excepts
from marital property anything that has been acquired by gift, bequest,
devise or descent.14 These exceptions involve means of acquiring property
which are clearly lucrative in nature.
The part of the settlement which compensated Mr. Nixon for his
pain and suffering (as opposed to damages the community may have

suffered) was, not property acquired by either onerous or lucrative title,
but was more in the nature of an exchange of property during the marriage, 15 a specific exception to the statutory presumption of marital property.' 0 This portion of the settlement took the place of Mr. Nixon's previous
good health and well-being, which had been injured. Because this part
of the compensation took the place of something which Mr. Nixon had
prior to marriage, the recovery for it should have been considered to be
his separate property. Thus, it appears that the statute itself provides
a basis for judicial recognition that the settlement for a personal injury
is composed of two parts; one part compensates the marital community
for damages to it, while the other part is awarded to compensate the
injured spouse for his lost health.
A further basis for a division of personal injury awards into two
parts stems from the recognition of Missouri's adoption of community
property principles for purposes of distribution of marital property under
the new act. The definition of marital property under section 452.330
corresponds to that of community property in the eight community states.1 7
Therefore, in construing the statute, the courts of Missouri should look
to the manner in which damages recovered for personal injuries are
treated in community property states. Such damages, as well as the cause
of action for their recovery, are considered to be "property" in community property states.' 8 The problem is that in those states there is
disagreement as to whether the rights arising because of a personal injury
12.

W. DEFUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF

COMMUNITY

PROPERTY §

62

(2d ed. 1971).
13. Id.
14. § 452.330 (2), RSMo' 1973 Supp. See note 4 and -accompanying text supra.
15. W. DEFuNIAx &c M. VAUGHN, supra note 12, at § 82.
16. § 452.330 (2), RSMo 1973 Supp.
17. See W. DEFUNIAK &cM. VAUGHN, supra note 12, at §§ 58-60.1.
18. Id. at § 82. Note that Missouri distinguishes between a cause of action
and a judgment. A cause of action is not assignable, while a judgment (or
settlement) is. Forsthove v. Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 416 .S.W.2d
208 (St. L. Mo. App. 1967). Thus, there may be some question, as to whether
a cause of action for personal injuries (as distinguished from a judgment or
- : - ,
settlement) can be "marital property" in Missouri.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1976
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should be treated as community property or as the injured spouse's separate property.
The traditional view in community property states had been that a
personal injury award was community in nature, and therefore belonged
to both spouses. 19 However, there has been a clear abandonment of the
traditional view of treating personal injury awards as wholly community
property in Louisiana, 20 Texas, 21 New Mexico,22 and Nevada. 28 These
states split the damages into two separate parts. One part is considered
compensation for the injured spouse's personal injury, including pain
and suffering. The judgment or settlement for this part is the injured
spouse's separate property. The other part is said to compensate for
damages to the community, which includes medical expenses, loss of
services to the community, and loss of the earnings of the injured spouse.
This portion of the recovery, then, belongs to the community.
In Louisiana, the pertinent statute provides that damages recovered
by a husband for personal injuries are the property of the community. 24
The Louisiana courts, however, have allowed a divorced wife to recover
from her husband an interest in only that amount of his recovery which
is attributable to the community, allowing the husband a separate amount
for the disability he suffered.2 5 Texas, which had long followed the traditional view, 28 recently adopted the new approach by statute. 27 This statute
merely codified prior case law, however, because the Texas Supreme Court
had previously accepted the theory of separation of damages "independent
of statute."28 New Mexico goes so far as to recognize two completely
separate causes of action when there has been a personal injury to a
spouse. 29 One action belongs solely to the injured spouse for that part
of the injury which is personal to him, while the other action belongs
to the community for the damages it suffered as a result of the injury. 0
A leading treatise on community property law states that of the eight
community property states, "only Arizona, California, Idaho and Washington [remain] in full support of the [traditional] view." 81 It appears,
19. W. DEFUNIAK

20.

LA.

Civ.

& M.

CoDE ANN.

94 (La. Ct. App. 1970).

supra note 12, at § 82.
art. 2402 (West 1973); Alfred v. Alfred, 237 So. 2d

VAUGHN,

21. Tx. FAm. CoDE § 5.01 (1973); Graham v. Franco, 488 S.W.2d 390 (Tex.
1972).
22. Soto v. Vandeventer, 56 N.M. 483, 245 P.2d 826 (1952).
23. Frederickson & Watson Constr. Co. v. Boyd, 60 Nev. 117, 102 P.2d 627
(1940).
24. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2402 (West 1973), as interpreted in Tally v.

Employer's Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 181 So. 2d 784, 787 (La. Ct. App. 1965).

,

25. Alfred v. Alfred, 237 So. 2d 94 (La. Ct. App. 1970); Talley v. Employer's
Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 181 So. 2d 784 (La. Ct. App. 1965).
26. Bohan v. Bohan, 56 S.W. 959 (Tex. Civ. App. 1900).
27. TEx. FAM. CODE § 5.01 (1973).
28. Graham v. Franco, 488 S.W.2d 390, 396 (Tex. 1972).
29. Soto v. Vandeventer, 56 N.M. 483, 245 P.2d 826 (1952). See Annot., 35

A.L.R.2d 1199 (1954).

30. 56 N.M. at 494, 245 P.2d at 832-33.
31. W. DEFUNTIAX & M. VAUGHN, supra note 12, at § 82 (emphasis added).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol41/iss4/9
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however, that even some of these states are now in less than "full support" of this view. In Doggett v. Boiler Engr & Supply Co.3 2 the Idaho
Supreme Court held that while the wife could be substituted as plaintiff
in her deceased husband's personil injury action, her recovery was limited
to damages to the community. The court, even though purportedly applying the traditional view, recognized the need to separate damages to the
community from those that are personal to the injured spouse. In Freehe
v. Freehe83 where a husband's injuries were negligently inflicted by the
wife, 3 4 the result of the ensuing divorce action was that the Washington
Supreme Court awarded part of the damages to the community and part
to the husband separately. Although the court distinguished the situation
from one in which a spouse is injured by a third person, Freehe never-

theless indicates a departure from the traditional view, since a strict
application of the traditional view would require all the damages to be
community property.
It seems dear, therefore, that recognition of the adoption of community property principles in the new act and proper reference to the
law of the community property jurisdictions could lead to a contrary
result in Nixon. The court should determine what portion of the settlement most likely was awarded as compensation for personal injury and
what portion most likely was awarded as compensation to the marital
community. Only the latter portion would be considered marital property
to be distributed in accordance with the act.
One writer has said of section 307 (b) of the Uniform Marriage and
Divorce Act, upon which section 452.330 (2) is based, that marital property
is only that property which can be said to be a "product" of the marriage.8 5 This interpretation of the Uniform Act is consistent with the
onerous title theory, discussed earlier. However, the result reached by
the Nixon court is not consistent with this reasoning, because it is clear
that not all of Mr. Nixon's settlement was a "product" of the marriage.
That portion of the settlement which was compensation for the loss of
earnings and medical expenses could be considered a product of the
marriage which belongs to the marital community. It merely took the
place of money that would have been acquired by onerous title had the
injury not been incurred. However, the part which compensated him for
the damage to his eyes is personal to him. It is difficult to see how this
latter part could be considered a "product" of the marriage.
The Nixon court failed to apply community property principles, upon
which section 452.330 is based, to the problem of whether personal injury
awards should be treated as marital property or as the separate property
32. 93 Idaho 888, 477 P.2d 511 (1970). The court in this case was *iorking
under a 'statute that defined community property in essentially the same terms
as section 452.330 (2), RSMo 1973 Supp. See IDAHo CODE § 32-903 (1947).
33. 81 Wash. 2d 183, 500 P.2d 771 (1972).
34. Washington abandoned the rule of interspousal immunity in Freehe.
35. Staff, Property, Maintenance, and Child Support Decrees Under the
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, 18 S.D.L. Rev. 559, 566-67 (1973).
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